1.) Introduction
F. A. Hayek's, (1942 Hayek's, ( , 1943b Hayek's, ( , 1944 Caldwell, 2010: 3) . There are so many interpretations of its arguments that Caldwell (2005: Appendix D) describes it as a Rorschach Test. While some (Burczak, 1994) see it as postmodern, or within the frame of hermeneutics (Madison, 1989 (Madison, , 1991 , others describe it as anti-modernist and non-hermeneutic (Caldwell, 1994) ; while some interpret it as almost positivistic (Lawson, 1997: Chapter 10) , others applaud the soundness of some of its ontological commitments (Runde, 2001 ).
Hayek's opaqueness has led to doubt, both conceptual and exegetical, out of which springs this extraordinary number of interpretations. But Hayek's Scientism essay is not a barren mismatch of contradictory lines of thought. It is, rather, a long, rich piece, with innovative reflections on topics ranging from the philosophy of science to psychology and the history of ideas, and pregnant with fruitful suggestions that the secondary literature tries to bring to light. It is a singular piece in the history of economic and social thought, and of great importance to Hayek's oeuvre. As Caldwell (1998: 224) writes, it "contains all the essential elements of [Hayek's] methodological programme."
If in detail Hayek's essay is almost kaleidoscopic, its main argument is clear. Hayek notices that the recognized success of the modern natural sciences has led to an emulation of their methods in other fields, often without due consideration to the specificities of their objects of study. He intends to show why the methods of the natural sciences are inappropriate for moral scientific explanation, and the errors to which their adoption in the moral sciences leads.
For Hayek, natural scientific explanation begins with the observation that people classify as similar what turns out to behave differently in similar circumstances, and vice-versa (1942: 83) . In her attempt to objectively explain phenomena, the natural scientist must therefore revise ordinary experience. The moral sciences, on t he other hand, are concerned with action. Yet, action is related to people's attitudes, i.e. to what they think, believe, desire, etc. Hence, unlike the natural scientist, the moral scientist cannot ignore, much less transcend, agents' subjectivity. But, if ordinary experience is shown by the natural sciences to lack external justification, the moral scientist cannot ascertain agents' attitudes by studying a reality external to them. The way out of this predicament is for the moral scientist, a being with a mind, to tap what she has in common with the agents she studies.
In the present article I wish to address the cogency of some of Hayek's arguments, and in so doing to illustrate the fruitfulness of his text as a point of departure for philosophical reflections on the nature of objectivity, subjectivity and intersubjectivity. After summarizing and discussing Hayek's main argument in section 2, I argue in section 3 that his thesis that ordinary experience lacks external justification hinges on his ignoring the social aspects of inquiry, and on implausible ontological commitments. I find, however, that the distinction he draws between the worldview of science and ordinary experience is sustainable on other grounds. In section 4, I turn to his thesis that moral scientific explanation is possible thanks to the fact that the scientist is similar to the agents she studies. I try to elucidate what this similarity is, and how it affects the understanding of agency. I emphasize the importance of behavioral evidence in the understanding of others, and notice that our attributions of attitudes to others are indeterminate with such evidence. Finally, I argue that the sort of description of mental events and states that interests the moral scientist involves properties related to the social context of interaction, and thus need have no strict relation to the agent's central nervous system.
2.) A discussion of Hayek's main argument: natural vs. moral scientific explanations

2.1.) The specificities of moral scientific explanation
According to Hayek, in the Renaissance (1942: 81 ) the "ways of thinking" (ibid.) of modern natural science began to "fight their way" (ibid.) against the established, prescientific frames of mind. The latter were often anthropomorphic or animistic, and inquiry was mostly limited to the study of ideas, either those of fellow men, or God's (1942: 81-2) . Science, he tells us, replaced these ways with an attempt to "get down to 'objective facts '" (1942: 82) . Although Hayek's account of the natural sciences begins with these diachronic observations, his argument focuses on how the natural sciences issue from our dissatisfaction with currently existing explanations of phenomena. He writes that the natural sciences "revise and reconstruct " (1942: 82) both the concepts and the very sense qualities that result from "ordinary experience", replacing them with a framework "based on consciously established relations between classes of events" (1942: 84) . Their goal is to attain general explanations, and the ability to recognize "the particular as an instance of a general rule " (1942: 82) 1 .
He explains that when scientists are dissatisfied with the way existing explanations cover a recalcitrant situation, they recreate prior conceptualizations, change their ways of grouping, classifying and comparing, and revise their beliefs on what there is. They often conclude that what seems different to our immediate senses, like ice and water (1942: 84) , may be nothing more than different manifestations of the same underlying substance, or that it makes sense to posit entities, as is the case with waves or electrons (ibid.), whose identification by the senses is indirect, but that enable the explanation of puzzling phenomena, such as why when we flick a switch light bulbs shine, or why we fall back on the floor when we jump.
When Hayek turns to the moral sciences, he writes that they are "concerned with man's conscious or reflected action" (1942: 88-9) . He informs us that it is not the goal of the moral sciences to explain individual action in detail, but rather the "sort of order
[which] arises as a result of individual action but without being designed by any (1942: 103) .
1 This goal of arriving at general rules has been interpreted by Runde (2001: 7) , in an article otherwise sympathetic to Hayek's Scientism essay, as a concession to a "positivist" view of science as "being about identifying and establishing event -regularities." But a striking aspect of the Scientism essay is
Hayek's insouciance about matters of terminological detail. Over a short number of pa ragraphs he breezily goes from speaking of reclassification of events (1942: 83) , to reclassification of objects (1942: 84) , reclassification of external stimuli (ibid.), phenomena (ibid.) and reclassification of sense impressions (1942: 89) . We should thus be wary of reading into Hayek any precise notion of event. Hayek (1942: p. 104 ) offers a famous example of such an order: the spontaneous development of a path through wilderness. Each person trying to get across wishes to follow a route that is safe, fast, and not too tiring. Who wouldn't? Confronted with virgin bush, the pioneers might have had to think almost each step through, making choices step by step. Their behavior left traces: obstacles removed, foliage cut, stones judiciously placed, and footprints, all offering the comfort of pri or human presence.
The people coming after the pioneers may have found these traces more or less salient.
As they made their own decisions, it is likely that they seized, consciously or not, the improvements of the pioneers', adding their own traces to tho se already existing. A few iterations afterwards, all these traces precipitated into a clear path which any walker traversing the wilderness will identify and follow. No one thought the path out, so the path is the result of human action but not of design. It is an unintended consequence of people traversing the wilderness. (1963: 3-4) calls "pro attitudes").
To offer an agent's reasons for acting is a form of causal explanation. When Hayek writes that the moral sciences do not explain action he could, arguably, b e taken to mean that we often do not need to be particularly thorough or detailed in the determination of reasons. Caldwell (2005: 246) , for instance, writes that it is 2 The relation between intentions and reasons has caveats which I will disregard (cf. Davidson, 1973: 79 Indeed, it is not relevant to the account of the appearance of the path whether the people were traversing the wilderness to meet their lovers, to please their king, or to search for gold. But to what detail agents' reasons have to be ascertained depends on the purposes of our research, and on our questions. If we want to explain not just the appearance of the path but also to account for its shape, we probably have to be more thorough in our understanding of agents' attitudes: were they trying to go as fast as possible, or erring on the side of safety? It would thus be important to know why the pioneers were traversing the wilderness, not just that they wished to do so. It is misleading to say that the moral sciences do not explain action without taking into consideration the particular questions being addressed. 
2.2.) The logic of agents' attitudes
From the fact that moral scientific explanations are concerned with action, and therefore with agents' attitudes, we may derive important logical implications. One is that the truth-value of statements in the moral sciences is frequently unrelated to the 3 There are passages in the Scientism essay, e.g. (1942: 88-9) , where Hayek explicitly refers to explanation of action in the moral sciences. Alternatively, Madison (1989: 66ff ) interprets Hayek's "explain" in the narrow sense of explanation "in physical terms", in opposition to interpreting the meaning of agents' doings. Understood this way, Hayek has a verstehen/erklären distinction in mind,
and by "explain" means subsuming under laws.
underlying matters of fact. The sentence "it is raining" may be true or false, but it does not explain Jane's decision to carry an umbrella unless the sentence "Jane believes that it is raining" is true 4 . Clearly, to understand individual action the moral scientist has to ascertain the truth of statements of the second kind, i.e. statements involving the propositional attitudes (to know that, to believe that, to wish that, etc.) Yet, the truthvalue of sentences of the form "Jane believes that p" are (logically) independent of the truth-value of p. This logical feature is not, however, unique to the moral sciences.
The natural sciences also have to deal with their share of opaqueness . is not a tool because it is made of a specific material or because it has a cert ain shape.
According to Hayek, something is a tool due to "the use for which it is designed by someone" (1942: 90 (1942: 90) . In other words, Hayek is telling us that physical or structural properties of things are neither necessary nor sufficient for their status as objects of action.
Hayek must not be taken to mean that the structural properties of particular things are irrelevant for concrete moral scientific practice. That there are usually no necessary or sufficient structural properties defining classes of objects of human action need not mean that there are no typical structural properties offering grounds in the 4 (Cf. Hayek, 1942: 93) : "What is relevant in the study of society is not whether these laws of nature are true in any objective sense, but solely whether they are believed and acted upon by the people."
determination of the likely role of a particular entity. We know, for instance, that oil is usually a primary factor, and that pasteurization is a common technique of production. As Hayek (1943a: 65-66) writes in The Facts of the Social Sciences, "as long as I move among my own kind of people, it is probably the physical properties of a bank note or a revolver from which I conclude that they are money or a weapon to the person holding them."
Although Hayek does not discuss it, it is also easy to show that the abstraction from the structural properties of things is not distinctive of the moral sciences. Many, if not all, the natural sciences employ functional notions, i.e. types that cannot be defined by the specific structural properties of their tokens, but by some sort of role, or function in a system or order. Take sunburns: a sunburn is definable as a burn caused by exposure to the sun. It is conceivable that two burns are identica l down to the atom, yet one be a sunburn and the other not. Yet 'sunburn' is a relevant notion for medical science: sunburns are associated with skin cancer 5 . Besides sunburns, defined by reference to their cause, i.e., to something external to the object, we could give 'poison', 'anxiolytic' or 'antipsychotic', defined by reference to their effects. What seems distinctive about the moral sciences is that the function or role is related to agents' attitudes.
In the Scientism essay, Hayek is concerned to show that the world which the agent writes, that in the moral sciences "our mind must remain not only data to be explained but also data on which the explanation of human action (…) must be based."
2.3.) Summary
In short, in the Scientism essay Hayek draws a sharp distinction between the worldview of everyday experience and that of natural science. Since ordinary experience is based on the effects things and events have on a percipient human being, natural science must revise ordinary experience if it is to successfully cover the relations things or events have between themselves. Since the moral sciences deal with agents' attitudes, the differences between ordinary and scientific worldviews imply th at the moral scientist cannot ascertain agents' attitudes just by studying the way things are, but needs to tap her own ordinary outlook as a fellow human being.
In the next section, I address Hayek's conception of ordinary experience and the arguments he gives for his claim that it lacks external justification. I will show that they are based on Hayek's ignoring the social aspects of inquiry, but that the distinction he draws between the two is robust to the failure of his arguments.
3.) 'Ordinary experience' in the Scientism essay 3.1.) Does 'ordinary experience' lack external justification?
As I noticed above, that ordinary experience is externally unjustified results from
Hayek's reflections in the natural sciences. In detail, Hayek tells us that natural science revises and replaces not only the concepts formed from ordinary experience but, more importantly, "the very sense qualities which most of us are inclined to reg ard as the ultimate reality" (1942: 83). Indeed, he goes so far as to write that the second form of reclassification is "the most characteristic procedure of th e natural sciences" (1942:
84). Unfortunately, the examples he gives fail to illustrate any replacement of sense qualities, or anything that is characteristic of the natural sciences.
The most detailed example Hayek (1942: 83) gives is that of a tasteless, scentless white powder, which may prove to be any number of substances, depending on how it reacts in several circumstances. But a distinction among several powders based on how we observe each to react is hardly an example of the replacement of sense qualities… All that happens is that those white powders were all believed to be the same until someone was led to conclude, certainly by way of sense impressions in volving qualities that are classified the same way they used to, that, say, some powders are good for leavening cakes and the others are not, even though they are all white 6 .
What Hayek's examples show is the possibility that our immediate sense impressions do not lead us to distinguishing between entities that, in different circumstances, are associated with other, also perceptual, effects that might make us revise our earlier judgments, and vice-versa. The lesson is hardly that people, much less science, replace "the system of classification which our sense qualities represent " (1942: 83) , but that the system of classification we employ, the characteristics we find salient or the distinctions we make are subject to revision in view of further evidence from our senses 7 . That our immediate impressions and judgments are often misleading is hardly a conclusion exclusive to science.
Moreover, further evidence is hardly the only reason that may lead us to abandon a previously adopted classification. Unsuitability to specific purposes may induce the same thing. Indeed, if a chemist in her lab may be interested in distinguishing between
Hayek's white powders, someone who is using them to teach the word "white" to young children is rather interested that any differences between the powders be ignored. But the other way around is also possible. If the two white powders are sodium bicarbonate (baking soda) and potassium bitartrate (cream of tartar), the ordinary person fighting heartburn is interested in distinguishing between the two, but the chemist who just wants to make an aqueous solution that moderately conducts electricity is not.
3.2.) Relations of similarity: criteria, standards and dimensions
As we have already noticed, throughout the Scientism essay Hayek emphasizes that classification is based on relations of similarity and difference. Hayek (1942: trying to do, to our standpoints, and discursive contexts. It is hardly different in the natural sciences. As noticed above, potassium bitartrate is similar to bicarbonate of soda in that both are often presented as white powders. But they differ in that the first can be used to form an acidic solution whereas the second forms an alkaline solution.
Yet they are similar in the sense that when in solution both conduct electricity.
The upshot is that judgments of similarity and difference are based on similarities and differences that matter for some purpose, in some context. Hayek, more than once, goes to the extent of saying that "we have learned that our senses make things appear to us alike or different which prove to be alike or different in none of their relations between themselves, but only in the way in which they affect our senses" (1942: 92 italics supplied). Literally understood, however, the possibility of things being different in absolutely no other respect than their effect on the senses defies credulity:
what would make them more than one thing in the first place?
What the systematic testing of science shows is that there are differences or effects that are irrelevant to some science's particular purposes at a particular time. But this is a warning against ignoring the social and human aspects of the several forms of inquiry. Judgments resulting from ordinary experience make real distinctions too, which are adjusted to ordinary purposes and are also subject to revision as such purposes change or new evidence accrues. The fact that they often are not suitable for what the natural scientist is trying to do in her particular context should hardly lead to the conclusion that they should be treated as delusions, even by the natural scientist, and even less to the conclusion that ordinary experience does not discern relations between things.
3.3.) Hayek's appearance-reality distinction
Hayek's distinction between a classification based on the effects of things on each other and a classification based on the effects of things on humans is, perhaps, the most visible and significant part of an undercurrent to the Scientism essay, where
Hayek makes an appearance-reality distinction. Hayek emphasizes that "'facts' are different from 'appearances'" (1942: 83), he speaks of "'secondary' qualities" (1942:
84) and of science's "emancipation" thereof (ibid.) and he mentions "the true nature of the material thing" (1942: 93) . He also distinguishes between the "'objective'
properties of things which manifest themselves in their relations to each other, and the properties merely attributed to them by men" (1942: 92), as though we could ever deal with properties that were not 'merely' attributed by men 8 .
I stress that this is an undercurrent not only because Hayek employs scare-quotes throughout, but mostly because in the Scientism essay he is explicit in affirming that whatever is turned out in the natural sciences must be connected with and somehow the result of the causal interaction between the world and our senses (1942: 84).
Indeed, there is no way to know the effects of things on each other that is not based on their, possibly indirect, effects on us, or to get away from appearances or secondary qualities of some sort. Moreover, in the Scientism essay, especially in the later parts, we also find passages where Hayek seems aware of the importance of accounting for the human aspect of all inquiry, for instance when he writes that "what make[s] a number of individual phenomena facts of one kind are the attributes which we select in order to treat them as members of one class" (1943b: 110 italics supplied) 9 .
8 In The Sensory Order, Hayek is more careful: "the contrast with which we are concerned is not between 'appearance' and 'reality' but between the differences of events in their effects upon each other and the differences in their effects on us. (…) For the purposes of our discussion, at any rate, we shall not be interested in what a thing 'is' or 'really is' (whatever that may mean), but solely in how a particular object or event differs from other objects or events belonging to the same order or universe of discourse" Hayek (1952: 4 when expectations are frustrated, people revise them: they change the distinctions they find important to make or to blur, they induce along other paths, and often posit new entities. When they are puzzled they may offer bold redefinitions, and may, as science does, hypostatize all sorts of exotic entities in the deepest parts of their ontologies, be they quarks or supernatural activity 10 .
There are, of course, differences in the purposes, sophistication, contexts and goals that may justify distinctions between kinds of inquiry 11 . But these are differences in the social aspects of inquiry, not in fundamental method or superior truthfulness of their results. As Quine (1969a: 129) puts it, "science (…) differs from common sense only in degree of methodological sophistication."
3.4.) Ontological commitments in the Scientism essay
Now, if Hayek's arguments for the contrast between ordinary experience and the worldview of science should be rejected, the contrast itself can be reinterpreted and upheld from a different, sociological perspective. As noticed, the differences Hayek notices between the two are not the result of significant differences in method and much less a matter of external justifiability, but social matters of appropriateness to the purposes and contexts of differently motivated people acting in different communities. We may thus get rid of false dichotomies and keep an important contribution of the Scientism essay, viz. the distinction between problems whose (interesting) answers involve an essential appeal to agents' attitudes, and problems whose answers are couched in "physical terms" (1942: 94).
Here, however, I must notice an important matter of ontology. When Hayek emphasizes reality external to people he is implicitly assuming the existence of the sensory being. However, it is hardly tenable that such beings belong to the ontologies Hayek's point seems to be that we cannot understand the role of (previously individuated) entities in human action by studying them, and without taking agents'
(subjective) attitudes involving them into account (Cf. 1943b: 109) . The properties in them may be "alike" whilst their properties out of them be unlike: two sticks of butter may be alike down to the atom but differ in that one will be incorporated into a chocolate cake and the other into a carrot cake. However, the properties we identify and find interesting depend on our purposes and, as noticed in section 2, natural science also employs functional notions. Also, what belongs to our ontologies is very much dependent on the theories we are using and, as Quine (1968) shows, underdetermined by the evidence of our senses, all the evidence we have.
My criticism in this section has not indicted but rather reinterpreted Hayek's distinction between the worldview issuing from the natural sciences and ordinary experience. But, as I show in the next section, Hayek's tendency to disregard social contexts also plagues his thesis of the similarity of the minds. Moreover, it was not from the contrast itself but from its supposed implication that ordinary experience lacks external justification that Hayek concluded that the similarity of minds is "a significant datum of experience" and "the starting point in any di scussion of human behavior". But if my arguments in this section are sound, there is no prior objectivity to serve as touchstone for the worldview of other agents. Hayek's thesis of the similarity of the minds and how to turn it into an understanding of ag ency is the topic of the next section.
4.) From subjective similarities to intersubjective understanding
4.1.) Understanding as projection of mental categories
I have shown that, for Hayek, even though agents' worldviews lack external justification, the moral scientist can nevertheless understand action because she has, and knows that she has, much in common with her subjects. But what exactly does
Hayek tell us that we all have in common, and how do we turn these commonalities into an understanding of action?
One thing Hayek makes clear is that he believes that all the evidence we use to understand other people is behavioral, i.e. what we observe them "do and say "(1942:
91)
12 . According to Hayek, we interpret such evidence "on the analogy of our own mind" (1943b: 139), i.e., to use an expression he employs in The Facts (1943a: 64),
by "projecting" onto others "the familiar categories of our own thinking" (1943b: 139).
In so doing, we go beyond the immediate evidence. As he writes, "we add" (ibid.) or As noticed in section 2, if a classification of action into broad, abstract types may be sufficient for some purposes, we often wish to be more detailed in our recovery of agents' reasons for acting. This is true of the moral scientist and of the average person in her everyday interactions 13 . We may not be satisfied with recognizing behavior as punishment until we can understand why punishment is being meted out, or with recognizing that our friend is signaling without understanding what she is trying to convey and why. I think this can be accommodated by Hayek's thesis that we interpret others on the analogy of our mind if we take Hayek's analogy in a broad sense , as there is a rational pattern 14 .
As noticed by Hayek, we interact with people by talking with them, observing what they do in public, and then trying to integrate this evidence into coherent frameworks that account for their behavior. Naturally, how we go about integrating the evidence is geared to our purposes. If sometimes we will be satisfied with accounting for someone's concrete reasons for concrete actions, other times we wish to develop complex theories about a specific agent, and make sense in a unified way of our frequent interactions: we want to identify traits of character, perhaps.
13 Notice that Hayek cannot at this juncture draw a line between the method of the moral sciences and that of common-sense understanding because he is using the latter to identify the denotation of the types used in the explanation of unintended orders.
14 See (Barry, 1979: 26) for a more critical interpretation of this point.
When we first meet someone we do not start from scratch: we have a few promising general hypotheses about others -ideal types, perhaps -that serve as starting points and are selected based on immediate evidence and context: people's appearance or accent, the place we are at, our mood, etc. These first unifying hypotheses are what we can come up with right off the bat, and probably include much of what Hayek intended to convey with his projections. With further interaction, we revise and supplement these broad, subconsciously selected, hypotheses and, perhaps, if the agent plays a frequent part in our life's play, we turn them into a custom -made theory about this person alone. As they are based on our judgments and projections, our theories are bound to have much of us in them.
As Hayek notices, in understanding others we always supplement the available, behavioral evidence. Although Hayek does not elaborate on this, such supplementation involves choice. Choice in selecting starting candidate hypotheses, and choice in the adjustments we make to them. It is a choice because there are always many hypotheses that we could justifiably offer, cumulating in potentially contradictory theories about the agent or action, yet all equally compatible with the evidence available. The explanatory path we follow results from our previous experience as social beings, and bear the sign of our idiosyncrasy and of the social context of interaction. There is no expectation that we can uniquely determine our theories with the behavioral evidence available, or reduce the former to the latter: as Quine (1973: 178) notices, there are "irreducible leaps" in theory building.
More succinctly: "there seem bound to be systematically very different choices, all of which do justice to all dispositions to verbal behavior on the part of all concerned" (Quine, 1969b: 54 italics supplied) . This is Quine's (1964) famous thesis of the "indeterminacy of translation" 15 . What is important about these observations is that the indeterminacy is not some limitation of our knowledge. Our interaction is intersubjective, and hence public: if all our interaction is based on behavioral evidence, 15 Not to be confused with the Duhem-Quine thesis of the underdetermination of theory by evidence.
The indeterminacy of translation is additional to the underdetermination of theory by evidence. The underdetermination thesis tells us, in a nutshell, that several theories may equally fit all our evidence and still imply contradictory sentences, whereas the indeterminacy further tells us that there are many ways of translating one of these theories into some metatheory. For the relation between the two, see (Quine, 1970) , for a critique of the Duhem-Quine thesis, see (Quine, 1975) .
there is nothing to determine that is not determined by this evidence. One theory that accounts for all the evidence is thus not truer to the facts of the matter than another that does so equally well, no matter how different in their non -empirical implications they may be. Facts that "what we mean when we speak of another mind is that we can connect what
4.2.) Indeterminacy and what
we observe because the things we observe fit into the way of our own thinking" (1943a:
66 italics supplied), he also writes that "the fact that men classify external stimuli in a particular way becomes a significant fact of experience which must be the starting point in any discussion of human behavior." (1942: 92 italics supplied)
In other words, on the one hand, Hayek says that it is inconceivable that there should be a mind radically different from our own, by the very meaning of mind. On the other hand, he tells us that our coming to realize that things have properties different than those we identify after their immediate effect on our sensorial apparatus makes the fact that people classify things in similar ways something we have learned from experience.
Whether he is right or wrong, I think Hayek's position is not contradictory. Indeed, Quine (1951) has long taught us that whether a truth is analytic or synthetic is a matter of degree. There are statements in our web of beliefs that we are more reluctant to abandon than others: we may redefine notions in order to keep cherished statements true in the face of new evidence, as we choose to throw other beliefs by the board.
What used to be 'constitutive' may become only synthetic: it may have been constitutive of our notion of 'mind' that whatever is a mind must share the same basic structure, but as we learn, so Hayek tells us, that actually the world is not like our senses tell us it is, we redefine mind in a way that their similarity is now an empirical statement about human minds. (1952: 135) used, when perceived by his interlocutors, will "occupy in their mental or der a position analogous to that which they occupy in his own; and which, in consequence, will have for those other persons a meaning similar to that which it possesses for him" (1952:
135 italics supplied, see also Chapter 5, section 7 and 1943b: 110) . Successful communication seems to be explained by there being a corresponding placement of shared events in each mind's order, perhaps made possible by the structural similarity that results from similar histories.
I wish to highlight two theses from this excursus through The Sensory Order. First, since Hayek indicates that communication is a consequence of shared events occupying "analogous positions" in the present mental order, this reinforces the point that he must believe that there is some relation of similarity over (subjective) mental positions that is logically prior to, and accounts for, intersubjective agreement. Second, the account and definition of mind found in The Sensory Order implies that we cannot have differences in the mental order that are not associated with some difference in the central nervous system of the subjects. In other words, it is not possible for two people to be anatomically identical, yet be in different mental states (1952: 110) . The picture that emerges is that of a subject, with a mind dependent on interactions with the environment but independent of other minds, of a relation of similarity over mental states that is solely dependent on the subjects' present anatomy, and of intersubjective agreement as a particular correspondence between similar subjective mental placements of shared inputs.
But what is this prior standard of similarity? Hayek never spells it out, but if it is to throw any light on how people in general, and the moral scientist in particular, use mental notions and determine attitudes in their endeavors to understand action , it must reproduce the discrimination made by the manifold public standards that are employed in the understanding of action.
There are good reasons to believe no such prior standard is possible. Not only would such a standard be based on evidence that is not available in the public world out of which our attributions of attitudes and intersubjective understanding arises, but also the rules of inference and of normative self-extrapolation have no equivalent in our understanding of brain structures. Hayek notices, and well, that we interpret others on the analogy of our own mind, but no such tendency enters our theorizing a bout the central nervous system. In a Wittgensteinian jargon, we are looking at two very different language games. As we may have two bushes with the exact same overall shape without there being any discernible pattern of similarity or "homeomorphism"
at the level of the (topological) placement of individual twigs and branches, our unique
brains may yet cumulate in what are, for our theories and judgments based on public evidence and self-projecting tendencies, equal attitudes 16 .
The upshot is that if the descriptions we utilize to identify types of mental phenomena, and, in particular, to individuate and characterize the propositional attitudes, are based on the intercourse occurring in the public, intersubjective world outside a n individual's Indeed, what my criticism in this section destroys is the hope that we will find in the concept of mind discussed in The Sensory Order much that will be of service for the intersubjective notion of mind that is central to the moral sciences . This indicts Hayek the moral scientist (not the psychologist) insofar as he is interpreted as finding the similarity that is relevant for understanding action as a homeomorphism of structures individuated without explicit appeal to a social context.
5.) Conclusion
In this article I explored Hayek's arguments for distinguishing ordinary experience from the worldview of science. I showed that the distinction may work for some purposes, but that it cannot, as Hayek tried to do, be sustained on differences in method or justifiability. I also discussed Hayek's thesis that people have similar minds, and tried to elucidate how we go about understanding each other, concluding that any notion of mind of interest to the student of action cannot ignore the intersubjective world outside agents' central nervous system.
A problem I diagnosed with Hayek's thought within the decade of the publishing of the Scientism essay is his neglect of the social context of inquiry, and the social conditions of objectivity and truth (with occasional exceptions, as in Hayek, 1944: 153) . In the Scientism essay this is best seen in his ignoring the contexts and purposes of inquiry and the reasonableness of several similarity scales. In The Sensory Order it is, arguably, more obvious as Hayek tries to describe the development of the individual mind without ever discussing its interaction with other minds but only with a normatively amorphous environment. If this might be acceptable to the neuropsychologist, it is not for the moral scientist. Hayek reads as though a mind could have the notion of objectivity without being member of a community of fellow creatures, without being able to triangulate, to go to some metatheory where it can discuss its theories in some language. His arguments are thus weakened by a sharp distinction between subjectivism and objectivism, whereas it is more fruitful to think of both as emerging together, in an intersubjective, social, world (Cf. Davidson, 1995) .
One of the purposes of this article was also to illustrate the fru itfulness of Hayek's Scientism essay. I believe only a mind like Hayek's could follow so many conflicting
